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This paper simply reproduces a presentation made at a conference on 
"Union Rights in an E.C. and Central European Perspective" (Certosa di 
Pontigna.no, 6-7 December 1991), held within the celebrations of the 750th 
Anniversary of the University of Siena and organised by Prof. Silvana 
Sciarra. With her kind permission, we publish it now as an E.U.I. Working 
Paper.
It should be noted that the word "liberalism" is used throughout the 
essay in its politico-legal meaning, i.e. as an abbreviation for expressions 
such as "rule of law" or "Rechtsstaat". It would be misleading to 
understand it in its economic or "laissez faire" sense. On the other hand, 
judicial decisions are cited in the usual way of the corresponding 
jurisdiction.
We warmly thank Alison Tuck not only for having typed our manuscript, 
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I. SOCIAL RIGHTS: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
It is well known that the idea o-f social rights is alien to the 
classical tradition of bills o-f rights, developed by liberal revolutions in 
the 18th and 19th centuries. The -first documents that proclaim social 
rights appeared only after World War' I and they reflected a heterogeneous 
ideological background. In fact, it is possible to identify three different 
lines of political thought at the origins of the concept of social rights.
First of all. there is the communist idea of "real freedom" (understood 
as an absence of material needs), that is opposed to the so-called "formal" 
or "bourgeois" liberties. An expression of this idea can be found in the 
several texts promulgated as a consequence of the 1917 Revolution, first 
only In the Soviet Union (1918 Working and Exploited People's Declaration of 
Rights, 1936 Constitution) and later also in other countries. These 
declarations, however, are absolutely irrelevant for comparative 
constitutional law analysis, not only because their ideological foundations 
radically differ from those of 1iberal-democratic countries, but especially 
because communism implied a frontal rejection of the cornerstone of 
constitutionalism: the limitation and control of political power through 
legal rules. The use of the word "constitution" in a communist context is, 
at best, merely rhetorical and lacks binding force whatsoever.
Secondly, it is necessary to consider those declarations of social 
rights that, though born from left-wing revolutionary movements, did not 
mean a break with the fundamental principles of democracy and rule of law. 
With the antecedent of the 1917 Mexican Constitution, this is remarkably the 



























































































document is highly valuable as the starting point in the process of 
acceptance of the idea of social rights by European constitutionalism. Vet 
it is scarcely significant for the understanding of present legal problems, 
because it was not completed with adequate mecanisms of judicial enforcement 
(in substance, judicial review of legislation) and above all because the 
cruel totalitarian gap prevented its continuity and development.
Lastly, there is the rise of the welfare state after 1945. Here the 
background is more complex, because Keynesian economic doctrines (in favour 
of active state intervention in economic and social life in order to avoid 
recession) concur with certain conceptions of justice that, differently from 
what had happened in the above-mentioned experiences, do not have socialism 
as their only source of inspiration. Christian and populist-conservative 
ideals have also contributed to this purpose. It is within the welfare 
state that the notion of social rights has enjoyed development in genuine 
legal terms, through the introduction of adequate techniques of protection 
and the advantage of a broad (though never absolute) political consensus.
As anybody can see, the historical meaning of social rights is far from 
being linear. They prove themselves to be equally problematic as a. legal 
category, even if the scope of analysis is circumscribed to liberal- 
democratic countries. This is basically due to the fact that the very 
concept of social rights is an equivocal one. Nowadays it has become usual 
to speak about the different "generations" of human rights: the first 
generation would cover civil rights of individual autonomy and political 
rights of participation (thus safeguarding the basic elements both of 
liberalism and democracy), whereas the second generation would include those 



























































































The assumption is that the efficacy and meaning of classicai rights cannot 
be fully achieved without them. It is this second generation that is 
normally identified with social rights. Incidentally, it is worthwhile 
underlining that in the last decades reference is being made to a third 
generation of rights, characterised by the collective nature of the 
interests at stake (environment, artistic patrimony, etc.).
Despite any possible consideration about its historical accuracy, it is 
obvious that this generational viewpoint implies a substantial 
classification of human rights. In other words, to think of rights in terms 
of generations means, among other things, to classify them according to the 
type of interests or values they protect. Hence, precisely, the above- 
mentioned equivocation: independently from the protected object, rights can 
also be classified according to their legal structure, that is the kind of 
entitlement they provide. Thus, there is a widespread reflex thought that 
compels towards a simple definition of social rights as entitlements to 
obtain services from public authorities in order to improve material and 
spiritual conditions of life. Nevertheless, the criterion of the protected 
interest or value and that of the legal structure or entitlement do not 
always coincide. Not all the rights that can be defined as social from a 
substantial or axiological point of view consist of the entitlment to be 
provided with certain services, nor (and this is extremely important) do 
they necessarily consist only of this. Suffice to mention some elementary 
examples. It cannot be seriously denied that, given their axiological 
contents, trade unions' freedom and right to strike belong to the category 
of social rights, in that they are wage-earning workers' essential weapons 
to fight in order to improve their conditions of life; but, from the point 




























































































any service, but are closer to classical rights. It is clear, on the other 
hand, that the right to education consists primarily of being admitted to 
educational facilities and enjoying them, or that the right to health 
consists basically of the possibility to use the health service; but it is 
not to be doubted that these welfare rights can have certain collateral 
aspects which are structurally similar to rights of individual autonomy and 
political participation, such as the claim to choose a type of religious and 
moral education (or, even, a kind of school) and to take part in the 
administration of schools, or the claim to be informed and consulted by 
doctors before certain medical treatments are undertaken. This scene will 
be more complex if one considers that nowadays some classical rights are 
deemed to be incomplete without certain services. For instance, the right 
of access to justice and due process of law does not only include the 
possibility to defend one's own interests before law courts, but also that 
this possibility is not impaired by economic obstacles. This is why
institutions such as legal aid or public counsel are so deeply rooted in 
contemporary legal civilization.
The distinction between the structure of rights and the values they 
protect is important, at least for three reasons. First, it shows that the 
classification of human rights into generations is not absolute and that all 
of them share the same function, namely to constitute minimum standards of 
human dignity in a civilised community. Secondly, the suitability of 
remedies for the protection and enforcement of rights must not be assessed 
in relation to the value they incorporate, but in relation to their 
structure, that is the type of entitlements they provide for individuals. 
As will be seen later, many of the problems usually connected to social 



























































































services. Yet this feature neither fits all social rights, nor belongs only 
to them. Thirdly, the political dispute on the expediency and scope of 
having a delcaration of social rights derives as well from the lack of 
differentation between these two aspects. So this distinction can be useful 
in order to make a balanced evaluation of social rights and a solid 
contribution to their legitimacy in contemporary constitutional law.
Before concluding this conceptual approach to social rights, it is 
advisable to make reference to a further source of equivocation. When 
speaking of social rights (and, more generally, of human rights!, it is not 
unusual that they are looked at in a uniform way, as if the legal system in 
which they function and the level they occupy in such a legal system were 
irrelevant. Thus, in international law, human rights are nothing more than 
some objective values that states are bound to respect and safeguard within 
their jurisdiction under the penalty of international responsibility. This 
is also their meaning even in those more developed and sophisticated 
regional systems that, like the European Convention on Human Rights, allow 
individuals direct access to independent transnational tribunals; regional 
systems, moreover, whose level of protection of specifically social rights 
is undoubtedly low. This, of course, is not intended to mean that under 
other perspectives (creation of a European "ius commune”, moral and 
persuasive authority, etc.) the experience of the European Convention is not 
highly appreciable. On the contrary, in domestic law, the legal force of 
human rights depends basically on two circumstances: whether they are or 
not guaranteed at a constitutional level and whether the constitution itself 
establishes mechanisms of judicial enforcement in order to safeguard its own 
supremacy. Despite the fact that morally and politically it can make sense 




























































































especially a comparative constitutional law one, like this) demands taking 
into consideration legal realities homogeneous enough to be comparable.
The question under examination is the constitutionalisation of social 
rights, i.e. how some social rights have become "fundamental" rights or 
rights with a constitutional status, as well as what are the legal and
political problems posed by it. So the scope of the analysis has to be
limited to those liberal-democratic countries whose constitutions include 
some provisions in this respect (or, at least, do not prevent some
interpretative development in this direction) and are provided with some 
mechanism of judicial review of legislation. Anglo-American
constitutionalism is of little interest in this field: in the case of the
United Kingdom, because it lacks a constitutional bill of rights; in the 
case of the United States, because (except for some welfare principles 
concerning the fairness of criminal procedure, which are clearly collateral 
here) the Supreme Court has always been reluctant to give the U.S.
Constitution interpretations that cannot be justified, in one way or 
another, with the so-called original intention of the framers. Therefore, 
it is convenient to concentrate on certain Western European legal systems 
(Italy, France, Germany, Spain) which, apart fron the above-mentioned 
characteristics, also share the circumstance that their constitutions were 





























































































II. SOCIAL RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
1. Italy
The 1948 Italian Constitution contains a wide catalogue of fundamental 
rights. It can claim to be among the most progressive constitutional 
charters. It had been discussed in the Constituent Assembly whether to 
include social rights in a separate declaration, because some deputies (such 
as P. Calamandrei) wanted a "programmatic" nature of social rights clearly 
stated and opposed to the fully binding character and direct enforceability 
of all the other constitutional provisions. Yet this proposal was rejected 
because the majority wished to affirm (though without including a social 
state clause) the social aspect of the new political and social order.
The Constituent Assembly's special concern for social rights can be 
appreciated in its effort to systematise them. Social rights are built upon 
the concept of human personality and within the framework of social 
relationships that take place in the enterprise, the school, the family and 
other human groups. Thus, apart from the state duty to make effective the 
right to work (Art. 4), the Constitution regulates social rights in Titles 
II and III of Part I, under the headings "Ethical and Social Relations" and 
"Economic Relations" (Arts. 29 to 47). The declaration of social rights is 
thus exhaustive in the fields of work, education, family and health.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the Italian Constitution has given 
social rights a constitutional status. The level of protection they are 
provided with largely depends on how detailed the wording of the 




























































































provisions (such as Art. 31, which foresees state economic incentives for 
families! are not judicially enforceable. This leads to a basic distinction 
among fundamental rights in Italian constitutional law: those which are 
directly enforceable and those whose applicabi1ity needs some previous 
infrestructure. In other words, the former do not need any legislative 
intervention, whereas the latter depend' on legislation to implement the 
service of which they consist. When this is the case, the Constitution 
determines who is the holder of the right, but leaves it to legislative 
discretion to define how and when the service can be supplied. For 
instance, the right to health can have different levels of protection 
depending on which of its aspects is considered: as the right to psychical 
and physical integrity, it is a subjective right directly guaranteed by the 
Constitution, but as the right to medical treatment it is a service right 
depending on the health system facilities and rules of organization (see 
Sent. no. 455, 1990).
So the Italian Constitutional Court has been inclined to define several 
social rights as genuine and directly enforceable rights. This is the case 
of the right to holiday, the right to a fair remuneration far work, trade 
union freedom both as a freedom to create and organize unions and to adhere 
or not to them, the right to social security, etc. When on the contrary 
legislative action is needed, the Constitutional Court controls whether the 
legislature degrades constitutional provisions or avoids implementing them. 
The Court is usually aware of the abjective obstacles faced by the 
legislature on implementing social rights and, particularly, how it is 
necessary to allocate the existing financial resources through a balance of 
the several interests at stake. It has held that the implementation of 




























































































balance with the other interests that enjoy an equivalent constitutional 
protection, as well as with the actual and objective availability of the 
necssary funds; a balance that, at any event, is subject to the review of 
this Court, through criteria suitable to preserve legislative discretion" 
(Sent. no. 455, 1990). The criteria so far used by the Court are three, 
namely the already mentioned principle of graduality of legislative 
innovations, the principle of provisional constitutionality in matters in 
need of legislative reform (decision S26/19B8) and the principle of 
unconstitutionaiity of incomplete legislative implementation of social 
rights.
This latter criterion, that has so far been applied only once, had led 
the Court to declare a new right not explicitly foressen by the 
Constitution. In a 1987 ruling (Sent. n. 215, 1987), the Italian 
Constitutional Court has substituted a new norm for the legislative rule 
under challenge, in order to make it consistent with constitutional 
requirements. Actually, according to the original version of the law, 
handicapped students' access to secondary and university education "will be" 
encouraged. The Court, considering this committment too vague, has changed 
the future tense into the present ("is encouraged"), thus introducing a 
directly enforceable right on the basis of constitutional provisions in 
favour of disabled persons (Art. 34 and 38).
To declare other new or unwritten social rights, the Court has made 
recourse to Art. 2 of the Constitution, which in an abstract formulation 
recognizes the inviolable rights of man. This has been the case with the 
right to housing. The Court held that the law on succession in rent 




























































































to unmarried partners (even if separated, when they have common children) 
and to "de facto" separated spouses (decision 404/1988). On other 
occasions, instead of using such a general provision as Art. 2, the Court 
adopted a less bold method: it has "enlarged" the contents of rights 
explicitly declared by the Constitution. For example, Art. 4, that 
recognizes the right to work, has been interpreted as comprehensive of the 
right not to have unreasonable limitations imposed in access to certain 
jobs, the right to choose a profession or the right not to be arbitrarily 
dismissed (see, as a recent example, Sent. no. 97, 1987).
Summing up, one can say that the Italian Constitution proves to be a 
"living" document, due to the activism of the Constitutional Court, which 
refuses to consider constitutional interpretation as a once-ana-for— all 
task.
ranee
The 1958 French Constitution does not expressly declare any social 
rights. This is due to the fact that the Constitution of the present Fifth 
Republic was not drafted by any constituent assembly, but by the last 
government of the Fourth Republic presided over by General De Gaulle. After 
consultation with an "ad hoc" constitutional committee, the project was 
approved in a referendum. This text deals only with the organisation of 
state powers and lacks a bill of rights. This lacuna can be understood 
under the pressing circumstances of 1958 (the situation in Algeria and its 
repercussions on home politics) and the hurry with which the new 
Constitution had to be prepared. In order to facilitate consensus regarding 




























































































Constitution made reference to the 1789 Declaration of Rights of Man and 
Citizen and to the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946.
The legal force of the 1789 Declaration had already been discussed 
under the Third and Fourth Republics. This question was raised again after 
1958, but in a radically different context since the present Constitution 
establishes an organ with the specific task of reviewing the 
constitutionality of legislation. It is true that this organ, the 
Constitutional Council, had been intended to be, in the drafters' minds, a 
watchdog of the constitutional division of law-making powers between the 
legislature and the executive. However, the Council itself had changed its 
role from that of a "cannon pointed at Parliament" into that of defender of 
fundamental rights. After 13 years of existence, the Council proved to be a 
real constitutional court when, on 16 July 1971, it passed a decision that 
acknowledged the binding force of the Preamble to the 1958 Constitution. 
The Council was aware of the unfeasibility of judicial review of legislation 
without a bill of rights and, consequently, through the acceptance of the 
normative nature of the Preamble it indirectly incorporated a bill of 
rights: the 1789 Declaration and the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution.
Nowadays, ail the fundamental rights included in these texts enjoy 
constitutional status. But the choice made in 1958 not to enact a bill of 
rights continues to produce some consequences, in that the list of explicit 
fundamental rights is clearly shorter than in other European countries. The 
1789 Declaration only recognizes classical rights. The Preamble to the 1946 
Constitution, in its turn, although belonging to the same period as the 
Italian and German Constitutions, suffers from its peculiar point of view, 




























































































"political, economic and social principles particularly necessary in our 
time", among which one can identify some social rights: right to work, 
trade union freedom, right to strike, right to collective bargaining, right 
to health, right to education, etc. However, the social rights that have so 
far been applied by the Constitutional Council are not many and, above all, 
it is difficult to identify their contents because the Council motivates its 
decisions in a very succinct way.
In the field of labour relations, the Council has recognised several 
rights. Thus, the right to take part in collective bargaining belongs to 
every worker, including public servants; but the Council has declared that 
the exclusion of young workers employed within the framework of economic 
measures to encourage their employment in not unconstitutional, since there 
must be some legislative discretion to organise collective bargaining. As 
for the right to strike, the Council has said that it is not an absolute 
right, but one that must be reconciled with other constitutionally protected 
interests, for which some discretion is given to the legislature. In this 
way, limitations to the right to strike in order to safeguard the continuity 
of public services, people's health or the safety of property have been held 
to be in conformity with constitutional requirements. On the other hand, 
trade union freedom has also been declared both as the right to create and 
organise unions and as the right to join them or not. Trade unions must 
always respect their members' individual freedom.
The scope of legislative discretion is wider when service rights are at 
stake, because they need statutory implementation. So, in spite of its 
recognition by the Council, the right to work has to be developed by the




























































































obtain a job and simultaneously to allow this chance to as great a number of 
people as possible" (CC 83-1565. This aim justifies the imposition of taxes 
on professional activities in order to subsidise the unemployed or the 
prohibition of accumulating two different jobs (decision 200/19865. 
Regarding the right to sufficient means of existence, the Constitutional 
Council has simply referred its adequate satisfaction to the political 
branches of the state (CC 86-2255. The same reasoning has been applied to 
the constitutional requirement of "national solidarity" and "equality of 
distribution of public burdens" when national catastrophes occur (CC 87- 
237!.
Summing up, it is obvious that the possibilities of review are limited 
when social rights are concerned. The Council considers it to be its role 
to preserve some room for legislative discretion. Social rights are not 
conceived as genuine subjective rights in France. They are programmatic 
principles whose implementation and concrete scope depends on the 
legislature. According to the case-law of the Constitutional Council, 
social rights have a lower degree of protection than classical rights. In 
short, the “political, economic and social principles particularly necessary 
in our time” are deemed to be complementary to the rights and liberties 
embodied in the 1789 Declaration (CC 81-132), so that if there is a conflict 
the latter must prevail. However, legislative discretion is broader in the 
field of social rights than in that of civil and political rights. An 
argument in this direction can be drawn from Art. 34 of the Constitution, 
according to which it is the legislature that has to determine the basic 
guidelines of labour, trade union and social security law. Yet it is true 




























































































the guarantees of civil liberties, although the Council has not made use of 
this broad approach when civil and political rights are at stake.
Consequently, the function of the Council in the sphere of social
rights mainly remains that of watching the dividing-line between the 
legislature and the executive in respect of law-making powers. So
legislative discretion is little impaired, since the Constitutional Council 
does not envisage controlling the appropriateness or expediency of 
legislation passed to implement social rights. In the view of B. Genevois, 
Secretary-General of the Council, the most positive aspect of the
constitutional case-law in this field lies in that it prevents any attempt 
to go back as far as social conquests are concerned. Legislative discretion 
also explains why there are few rulings on social rights.
•j. ber many
Contrary to the Weimar Constitution, the present German Basic Law of 
1949 hardly includes social rights in its otherwise broad bill of rights. 
Apart from the different provisions concerning the protection of the family 
that are enunciated in Art. 6, the only specific social right recognised by 
the Basic Law is trade union freedom as declared in Art. 9 (III), which also 
covers the right to adopt measures of collective conflict. Except for every 
mother's right to enjoy the assistance of the community (Art. 6 (IV)), the
Basic Law carefully refrains from using any wording that could suggest the 
existence of fundamental rights to obtain services.
Consequently, the main characteristic of German constitutional law in 




























































































or service rights. This shortcoming is not an accident, but it was 
deliberately wished by the constitution-drafters. The most important 
reasons for this were (apart -from the lack of the required consensus among 
political parties) the desire to grant the legislature a wide margin of 
discretion in budgetary and financial matters, as well as the fear that 
economic conditions could prevent keeping constitutional promises, thus 
risking a delegitimisation of the whole Basic Law. In addition, there was a 
firm political will to follow a rigorous financial policy and to avoid a 
repetition of former inflation and recession experiences.
This argumentation is frequently adopted by a majority of scholars and 
the law courts against each new attempt to reinterpret the Basic Law in a 
social rights vein. Thus, the proposals to construe some rights of 
individual autonomy (such as freedom of education or freedom of profession) 
as comprehensive of those services necessary to encourage their full 
enjoyment have had scarce success. Much the same can be said of the 
attempts to read the principle of equality before the law (Art. 3) as an 
imposition of substantial equality. The case-law seems to be clear in that 
Art. 3 demands equal treatment for all the users of the existing public 
services, but it does not impose upon the legislature any given positive 
course of action.
What has been said so far should not be misleading: it would not be 
accurate to say that the Basic Law is indifferent vis-à-vis the material and 
spiritual conditions of life of individuals. Just the contrary, Art. 20 
defines Germany as a federal, democratic and social state. The richness of 
this "social state clause" in the field of constitutional interpretation




























































































Law is deemed to be entirely binding (i.e. none of its provisions has a 
merely programmatic character), so that Art. 20 results in a compulsory 
guideline for ail kinds of legal interpretation. One has to take into 
account as well that a purely procedural or neutral conception of the 
constitution has never been successful in Germany, but there is a widespread 
understanding of the Basic Law as the entrenchment of certain fundamental 
values. On the other hand, the Basic Law operates within the context of an 
old and deeply-rooted German tradition of charitable public institutions, 
according to which citizens' welfare is a state duty. It is not accidental 
that the German economic system is usually defined as a "social market 
economy". So the promotion function of declarations of social rights is 
less necessary in this case. The protection of social rights is well 
established and takes place at a statutory level.
This is the reason why the Federal Constitutional Court has not used 
the social state clause for the purpose of declaring specific social rights 
and, more generally, of establishing that some positive action is obligatory 
for the legislature. As a yardstick of the constitutionality of laws, Art. 
20 has been used merely to justify some legislative measures that limit the 
scope of private property (or other property rights, such as freedom of 
enterprise), the best known of which took place in 1979 with the ruling 
about codetermination in companies (BVerfSE, 50, 290).
Outside the scope of the social state clause, the Federal 
Constitutional Court has exceptionally declared the eixstence of a few "lato 
sensu" social rights on the grounds that they are an aspect of rights of 
individual autonomy explicitly included in the Basic Law. A paradigmatic 



























































































1972 CBVerfGE, 33, 303), where the Court held that such limitation of access 
is contrary to the freedom to choose a profession (Art. 12 Basic Law), 
unless two circumstances are met: that education facilities are really
exhausted and, if so, that the selection process is carried out according to 
objective criteria. As can be seen, even in cases like this the Federal 
Constitutional court has refused to recognise the existence of service 
rights deriving directly from the Constitution.
4. Spain
The drafters of the 1978 Spanish Constitution were lucky in that they 
were able to take account of the experience accumulated by Western European 
constitutionalism after World War II. Declaration and protection of social 
rights is a good example of this. In this respect, it is necessary to 
differentiate two lines within the Spanish Constitution. On the one hand, 
it follows the model of the German Basic Law (that was its main source of 
inspiration) and in Art. 1 it defines Spain as a "social and democratic 
state based on the rule of law". No doubt, this social state clause, if 
considered in isolation, lacks legal force to create rights. Yet it is also 
clear that, by virtue of the principle of interpretation in conformity with 
the Constitution, it must be used as a necessary guideline for the 
interpretation and enforcement of other constitutional provisions and 
ordinary legislation, thus inciting the efficacy and expansion of social 
rights. Gn the other hand, the Spanish Constitution rejects the German 
example (and adopts the Italian one) on including a long list of social 
rights into its bill of rights. However, a correct understanding of the 
status of these social rights demands some previous reference to the 




























































































The bill of rights is embodied in Title I of the Constitution, which 
classifies fundamental rights in three groups. The first group (Arts. 14 to 
29) covers most classical rights of individual autonomy and political 
participation, although it also includes some rights of a social nature 
(right to strike, trade union freedom, the different aspects of the right to 
education). The second group (Arts. 30 to 33) contains a series of rights 
and duties in most cases connected to the functioning of the economic system 
(safeguards of private property, collective bargaining, freedom of 
enterprise, etc.), even though it also regulates some rights that are closer 
to the liberal tradition (right to marriage and to equality between the 
spouses, right to conscientious objection to military service). The third 
group (arts. 39 to 52), under the significative heading "Principles 
governing social and economic policy", includes rights (and objective 
guarantees) to public services, such as the right to health, the guarantee 
of a public system of social security, the right to housing, etc., along 
with some rights of the so-called third generation and some aspects of the 
principle of equality (legal equality of children independently from their 
birth).
Each of these groups is characterised by a different level of 
protection. The first and second groups contain rights that can be directly 
claimed before law courts and are binding even for the legislature which, on 
passing any kind of legislation, always must respect their "essential 
contents" or hard core. The only difference between these two groups lies 
in that, as a matter of additional guarantee, violations of rights belonging 
to the first group can be brought before the Constitutional Court by 
individuals ("recurso de amparo") once ordinary judicial instances have been 



























































































different regime, set out in Art. 53(3) ofthe Constitution. According to 
this provision, the principles in question "will inspire legislation, 
judicial decisions and public authorities' activity, but they can be claimed 
before ordinary law courts only if in accordance with ordinary legislation 
passed to implement them".
This means that constitutional provisions included in this group do not 
directly create subjective rights that can be claimed by individuals before 
the law courts, but in order that they become genuine rights some 
"interpositio legislatoris" is indispensable. The rationale of this rule 
lies, as in German law, in the Constitution dra-fters' distrust vis-à-vis any 
norms that cold have heavily predetermined the legislators' freedom of 
choice in bugetary and economic matters. Nevertheless, it would be 
erroneous to say that these constitutional provisions lack legal force 
whatsoever. First of all, because they are guidelines both for public 
administration and judges, who consequently are bound to interpret and apply 
the whole legal order in the most favourable way to the efficacy of the 
values embodied in those articles. Moreover, they are programmatic rules 
for the legislature and, despite the fact that it is not feasible to make it 
pass the implementing legislation, they always work as negative limits, in 
that any law that infringes any of these provisions (similarly to what 
happens with the rest of the Constitution) can be declared unconstitutional 
and void. Thus, for instance, if a law privatised social security it would 
be unconstitutional.
Hence, given that they belong to this group, most service rights only 
enjoy this limited form of protection. It has prevented both ordinary law 



























































































obtain a concrete service. Services can be requested only by virtue of 
detailed statutory provisions. The only real exception to this general rule 
comes from the right to compulsory and gratuitous basic education (Art. 27 
(4) of the Constitution), which is unambiguously a right to obtain a service 
and, in principle, directly actionable. However, the Constitutional Court 
has connected this section of Art. 27 with the following one, according to 
which it is a duty of public authorities to set up the whole educational 
system and to create schools. The Court, in consequence, holds that the 
right to educational services cannot and does not exist "in abstracto" 
Ci.e., in any school at the user's choice), but within the statutory 
framework that defines basic education objectives and its infrestructure, 
(as a recent example of this case-law doctrine, see STC 19/1990). Quite a 
different question, of course, is whether such a statutory framework 
complies with the direct constitutional duty to provide everybody with 
compulsory and gratuitous basic education. If not, the law could be 
declared unconstitutional. As can be observed, even in this case the 
request for concrete services tends to be made dependent on statutory 
implementation.
The judicial enforcement of social rights other than service rights 
does not raise specific problems. There is a wide case-law. The 
Constitutional Court fully reviews legislative action in this field and, 
when cases on the right to strike and trade union freedom come up, it can 
also control single administrative decisions through the "recursc de amparo" 
(see, for recent cases, STC 38 and 45/1990). For review of administrative 
action concerning other social rights, only ordinary law courts have 
jurisdiction. To conclude, one should stress that there is little




























































































group of fundamental rights, perhaps due to their excessively general 
wording. So, for instance, the state duty to follow a policy oriented to 
full employment (Art. 401, in connection to the right to work (art. 35), was 
interpreted by the Constitutional Court as not comprehensive of a public 
obligation to provide a job to every unemployed person, as early as in a 



























































































II. AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS
The previous summary presentation of the constitutional protection of 
social rights in several Western European countries shows the existence of 
some common features. First of all, it is now clear what the function of 
social rights (or, depending on circumstances, of social state clauses) is: 
it highlights at the top normative level that the state is not indifferent 
or neutral in the economic and social sphere, that is as far as its 
citizens' material and spiritual conditions of life are concerned. This 
indicates that in present European constitutionalism a conception prevails 
according to which constitutions must proclaim and safeguard certain 
substantive basic values, thus drawing a dividing line vis-A -vis the Anglo- 
American world, more inclined to a procedural view of constitutions.
It also clearly emerges from the comparative analysis that the legal 
force of constitutionalised social rights is limited and, at any event, they 
do not enjoy the same degree of direct and full enforceabi1ity as civil and 
political rights, except when their structure does not consist of services 
(trade union freedom, right to strike, etc.). In the case of Germany, the 
reason for it is obvious, since the Basic Law does not explicitly recognise 
any social right. Yet it is remarkable that neither the French 
Constitutional Council nor the Spanish Constitutional Court have so far used 
their respective Constitutions to declare the existence of positive duties 
for public authorities, nor even to state that there are some genuine 
service or welfare rights deriving directly from constitutional provisions. 
On the contrary, they seem to have restrained themselves (not very 
differently from the German Federal Constitutional Court) to a merely 



























































































-  26 -
justify the constitutionality of innovative laws in economic or social 
matters, or to declare the unconstitutionality of those laws that do not 
sufficiently protect the values embodied in those recognised social rights. 
This leads to the judicial technique of the so-called "unconstitutionality 
for omission", which is not synonymous with judicial imposition of positive 
duties, but simply consists of invalidating an act for what it does not (and 
ought to) include. So, although the level of constitutional protection of 
social rights is connected to the existence and length of a declaration of 
them, it also depends on other factors.
The only partial exception to this trend seems to be Italy, where the 
Constitutional Court has developed a much more activistic attitude in these 
last years. The best proof of this attitude is the extremely complex set of 
decision techniques devised by the Constitutional Court (,! sentence
manipolative" , "sentenze addittive", etc.) in order to reinterpret
legislation in a compulsory and unavoidable way according to the
requirements that, in the Court's own view, derive from the Constitution.
It has led, if not to grant service rights directly (which, procedurally 
speaking, would be almost impossible, since in Italy there is no individual 
recourse to the Constitutional Court), at least to a quite similar outcome. 
The consequences of such a situation can be properly evaluated only if one 
considers the current discussion among scholars and politicians about public 
expenditure originating from the rulings of the Constitutional Court and, 
particularly, whether the Court is bound by Art. 81 (4) of the Italian 
Constitution: "Any other statute (i.e. different from the state budget) 
which involves new or higher expenses must indicate the corresponding
revenue". This behaviour of the Italian Court, that deviates from the self- 




























































































understood in the content of the Italian complex political situation, in 
that it prevents many social demands from being met by the political 
branches of the state. Probably, this helps such judicial activism (that 
would be unacceptable in other countries) enjoy a broad consensus among the 
population.
These remarks lead directly to the other set of questions that an 
overall assessment in this field has to face, namely to what extent it is 
expedient or advisable to constitutionalise certain social rights and 
especially those of a service kind? Here, there are good reasons on both 
sides. However, despite the heavy ideological nature of this problem, it 
seems possible to make some objective (or, at least, reasonably acceptable 
within a wide range of political opinions) reflexions that can illuminate 
the debate. So two facts are fairly clear. On the one hand, certain social 
conquests (education, health, pensions, etc.) already belong to the European 
cultural and political patrimony. If in addition one considers that the 
Continent has never been characterised by the same high degree of 
individualism as it is common in Anglo-Saxon societies, it will not be 
unreasonable that those conquests enjoy some safeguard at the top normative 
level, that is at a constitutional level. On the other hand, it must be 
submitted that the concrete and adequate way of implementing many social 
rights does not meet the same degree of political consensus as it does when 
classical rights are at stake, precisely because the implementation of the 
former is much more dependent on contingent circumstances and ideological 
preferences. Therefore, if one admits that the primary function of a 
constitution in a liberal-democratic state is to set up a basic framework: 
(both procedural and substantive) for political and social co-existence, it 




























































































likely to make it a partisan weapon. Shortly, any constitutional guarantee 
of social rights should be balanced with the requirements o-f political 
pluralism and possible different governments, as they fit a democratic 
society.
It is in close relation with this balance that the specific 
difficulties inherent in the enforement of welfare or service rights as 
fundamental rights have to be considered. No one can deny that, at the 
present stage of economic development and political civi1isation, the 
implementation of most constitutional commands in the social sphere cannot 
be achieved without legislative intermediation. ft different course of 
action would lead both to a dangerous imbalance among state powers 
(transforming the judiciary into a non-elected legislature or, even worse, a 
non-accountable administration) and the incapability of governing financial 
resources according to economic circumstances. In this sense, the 
argumentation that prevails in Germany is quite convincing. One could 
counter-argue that other fundamental rights (right to vote, right to public 
counsel, etc.) are not no-cost and nobody has ever questioned their direct 
enforceability. But, undoubtedly, the financial consequences of direct 
enforceability of service rights would be incalculably higher, not to 
mention the danger of delegitimisation of the constitution for having been 
unable to fulfil constitutionally created expectations. In addition, the 
necessary premise for the effectiveness of all public services is an orderly 
administered economic and financial situation. For all these reasons, to 
acknowledge the need to guarantee certain substantive values of an economic 
and social nature in the constitutions should not obstruct the awareness 
that social rights are not susceptible of enjoying the same level of 



























































































The awareness o-f this necessarily different level of protection should 
not be misleading. Constitutional delcarations of social rights have some 
binding force and constitutional courts have an important function to carry 
out. Their role, especially when service rights are concerned, consists of 
imposing limits to legislative discretion according to objective 
constitutional standards (i.e. the substantive values embodied in the 
constitution). However, as can be appreciated from the comparative 
analysis, the depth of the courts' intervention is also determined by other 
factors, such as the legislature's inertia and the concrete relations they 
have with the political branches of the state.
To close this critical evaluation, two further considerations are 
pertinent. First, nowadays the very idea of the welfare state is subject to 
criticism, at least as far as public services are concerned. Some argue 
that the service-supplier state should be substituted by the service- 
regulatory state. If this new conception succeeds, it will deeply influence 
the legal meaning and status of social rigthts. Secondly, there is a social 
trend, particularly widespread in Europe, that closely touches the problem 
of the constitutionalisation of social rights. It is what could be 
described as the "inflation of fundamental rights", that is the tendency to 
make of each new social or political demand a request for recognition of a 
new fundamental right. Probably this is no more than an expression of the 
wide pluralism of values that characterises the contemporary world, although 
it also indicates some inclination towards maximalism in that it implies an 
absence of differentiation on what values are really indispensable for a 
civilised coexistence. However, from the standpoint of constitutional law, 
it is worthwhile stressing that fundamental rights are those proclaimed by 



























































































cannot be disposed of by the legislature. Consequently, if there are too 
many fundamental rights, "fundamentality" will risk devaluation andthe 
effectiveness of guarantees that cannot be derogated will deteriorate. 
Perhaps it would be advisable for continental Europe to draw some lessons 
from the Anglo-American experience: politics (as opposed to law) can give a 
response to new demands and these can be met through statutory rights, 
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